Reflections on the Concept of Victory in Modern Warfare

Executive Summary - The Deadlock of Classical Doctrine

Over the past three years, military analysts and practitioners have frequently noted that Israeli strategy remains predicated on "short duration conflicts, shifting the engagement into enemy territory, and achieving rapid decisiveness." In practice, however, the Israeli public is repeatedly struck by a sense of surprise and disillusionment when these objectives fail to materialize. This gap arises because the classical perception is rooted in legacy conflicts, such as the Sinai Campaign, the Six-Day War, and the Yom Kippur War. These were inter-state wars between conventional forces operating under structured doctrines. In those conflicts, management was conducted by political echelons with organized decision-making processes, driven by a synthesis of national interests, ideology, and a fundamental adherence to the laws of armed conflict. In such a reality, the concept of victory was binary and absolute: at the conclusion of the campaign, the distinction between the victor and the vanquished state was unmistakable.

The Evolution of Warfare: From Conventional Forces to "Terror Armies"

In the last five decades, we have witnessed a paradigm shift in warfare, which directly impacts the ability to define victory. Modern conflicts, such as the First and Second Lebanon Wars and the "Iron Swords" campaign, diverge fundamentally from the classical model. The defining characteristic of these wars is the confrontation between a sovereign state and a "Terror Army." These entities (such as Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIS, or the PKK and FARC) function as "states-within-a-state" without defined sovereign borders, without accountability to international law, and without subordination to diplomatic frameworks.

The "Terror Army" presents unique operational challenges:

• Structure and Lethality: While not a standing national army, a terror army maintains a force structure equivalent to multiple divisions. These are organized into small, highly mobile tactical units (utilizing pick-up trucks, motorcycles, and light transport). They include specialized units for anti-tank warfare ("tank hunters"), intelligence collection, and special operations (commandos).

• Command and Control (C2): Utilization of C2 systems that, while not always high-tech, are highly resilient and effective for decentralized command.

• Arsenal: Access to advanced weaponry, including long-range anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) like the "Almas" and "Kornet," thermal imaging, and a sophisticated array of UAVs and loitering munitions. In some cases, these capabilities surpass those of modern Western European militaries.

• Operational Environment: Mastery of the local terrain and specialization in guerrilla tactics and urban warfare. Most significantly, they operate from within dense civilian centers, utilizing the population as both a human shield and a logistical base, while weaponizing fear against the non-combatant population.

• Ideological Center of Gravity: These organizations are often fueled by radical religious ideologies deeply embedded within their social base, making 'total eradication' an elusive, if not impossible, objective.

Notably, however, the Achilles' heel of these terror armies, much like conventional ones, is that as they scale, their physical footprint increases. The logistical requirements and the operation of heavy rocket/missile arrays (especially ballistic assets) create a signature on the ground. This allows conventional intelligence-driven forces to identify, track, and strike high-value targets.

The New Asymmetry and the War of Narratives

The concept of asymmetric warfare requires contemporary redefinition. It is no longer just a disparity in raw power, but a collision between a sovereign state and a terror army that often achieves technological parity in specific fields. In this arena, the perceived "inferiority" of the terror organization is leveraged as a cognitive advantage. The organization exploits this asymmetry to construct a narrative of "Resistance" (Muqawama) and grievance. For instance, Hezbollah frames itself as the "Defender of Lebanon" against an aggressor, while functioning as a strategic proxy for Iran to export the Shiite Islamic Revolution and seek the dissolution of Israel. This Information Operations (IO) effort is designed to foster the perception that "an idea cannot be killed," implying that strategic decisiveness is impossible—a psychological trap intended to erode the state's will to win.

Redefining Victory

Given this complex landscape, the political and security leadership must recalibrate the definition of victory. In modern warfare, victory is rarely a formal surrender ceremony; rather, it is a direct derivative of clearly defined strategic end-states. The sovereign, the military, and the citizenry require clarity: Why are we fighting, and what does the "finish line" look like? Victory is achieved when the pre-defined operational and political goals are met. This is how a coherent national narrative is built. Without achievable and clearly articulated goals, it is impossible to project an image of decisive victory in an age where the war of narratives or The Battle for Consciousness is paramount. The public must be convinced of a tangible, undeniable result. This is critical for national resilience and for countering enemy propaganda on social media, a domain that, in my view, has not yet been fully internalized as a primary theater of operations. This challenge will define the outcomes of all future military campaigns.